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Abstract
Previous research suggests that female politicians face higher standards in public
life, perhaps in part because female voters expect more from female politicians
than from male politicians. Most of this research is based on observational evid-
ence. We assess the relationship between accountability and gender using a novel
survey vignette experiment fielded in the UK in which voters choose between a
hypothetical incumbent (who could be male or female, corrupt or uncorrupt) and
another candidate. We do not find that female politicians face significantly greater
punishment for misconduct. However, the effect of politician gender on punishment
varies by voter gender, with female voters in particular more likely to punish female
politicians for misconduct. Our findings have implications for research on how de-
scriptive representation affects electoral accountability and on why corruption tends
to correlate negatively with women’s representation.
Keywords: accountability, conjoint analysis, corruption, gender
Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.
Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse
(http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop).
This research was supported by a grant from the Suntory and Toyota International
Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science (LSE). This research was conducted in line with the ethical
standards contained in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments.
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Perceptions of corruption tend to be lower where female political representation is higher
(Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001), but the mechanism behind this
pattern remains uncertain. Female politicians may have fewer opportunities to particip-
ate in corruption as they are excluded from predominantly male networks (Bjarnegård
2013). Women in politics may also be more highly-qualified (Anzia and Berry 2011),
more risk-averse (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer forthcoming), or more opposed in principle
to corruption (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001).
We focus on a further mechanism suggested by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (forth-
coming): female politicians in high-accountability contexts may be less corrupt because
they believe they are more likely to be held accountable by voters. We assess whether
this belief is accurate: Is it true that female politicians are more heavily punished for
comparable levels of misconduct? If so, is this due to differences in how men and wo-
men evaluate female politicians’ records, as suggested by the work of Jones (2014)? We
address these questions with a vignette experiment in the UK.
Our point of departure is gender stereotyping of politicians. One widely accepted view
is that men are seen as more agentic, i.e. competent and assertive, and women as more
communal, i.e. compassionate, warm and emotional (Dolan 2004). Women are also seen
as more honest than men (Dolan 2014b; Fridkin, Kenney, and Woodall 2009; Alexander
and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1992). Consistent with this, voters who value honesty are more
likely to vote for women than for men (Dolan 2004; Frederick and Streb 2008).1
These gender stereotypes imply that voters respond differently to misconduct by male
and female politicians. In the absence of evidence of misconduct, voters who view women
as more honest would support a female politician more than an otherwise-similar male
politician. The flip-side of this stereotyping is that female politicians have “further to fall”
if wrongdoing is revealed: to the extent that female politicians’ support draws more on
voters who are attracted to perceived integrity, their support stands to suffer more when
1The persistence of gender stereotypes stands in contrast to the weak to nonexistent
penalty for female candidates at the ballot box (Dolan 2014a). This discrepancy may
exist because female politicians are generally of higher quality and because voters face
multiple considerations in addition to candidate gender.
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a lack of integrity is found (Funk 1996: p. 18).2 Our first hypothesis is therefore: female
politicians are punished more severely than male politicians for equivalent misconduct
(H1).
Turning to the gender of voters, women have been found to on average be tougher on
corruption (Alatas et al. 2009; Eckel and Grossman 1996), perhaps because they value
honesty and integrity more. Our second hypothesis is thus: women punish misconduct
more severely than men (H2).
Finally, the difference between male and female voters’ behavior could depend on
whether the politician is male or female. If female voters care more about corruption,
and/or adhere more to gender stereotypes portraying female politicians as honest, then
the stronger punishment for female politicians may come disproportionately from female
voters. (For example, the “further to fall” hypothesis may apply only to female voters.)
Alternatively, following Jones (2014), female voters might punish female politicians more
because they are more engaged when evaluating female rather than male politicians. In
either case, the higher aggregate punishment of female politicians might originate with
female voters. Our third hypothesis is: women punish female politicians more severely
for misconduct than men (H3).3
Experimental design
We use a population-based survey experiment similar to choice-based conjoint analysis
(Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). To our knowledge, our experiment is
the first to consider how politician and voter gender affect punishment for corruption
2Formally, denote by xg,c the support level of a politician of gender g ∈ {m, f} (where
m is male, and f is female) given observed misconduct c ∈ {0, 1}. The claim is that
xf,0−xf,1 > xm,0−xm,1. In the simplest stereotype-based account, xf,0 > xm,0, because
the stereotype favors women in the absence of observed misconduct, but xf,1 = xm,1,
because once corruption is observed the stereotype does not matter.
3Accountability may also be lower when people evaluate politicians of the same gender
as themselves (Jones 2014). Our experimental design allows us to test this.
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(though Schwindt-Bayer, Verge, and Wiesehomeier (2016) have considered the context of
corruption in conjunction with politician gender).
We surveyed 1,962 British voters on 2-3 June 2014, with respondents drawn from the
YouGov online panel of over 360,000 people. The sample was designed to be representative
of the British voting-age population in terms of age, gender, region, social grade and
newspaper readership, though participants will be more experienced than the general
population in taking (political) surveys. YouGov samples nevertheless accurately depict
effect sizes of key predictors on vote choice (Sanders et al. 2007).
After an introductory screen, respondents were presented with five vignettes, each
depicting a contest between an incumbent and a challenger (see Figure 1 for an example
choice task). The incumbent could randomly exhibit good or bad conduct: ‘Last year, the
current MP received a commendation for diligent and ethical service from a Westminster
watchdog’ or ‘Last year, the current MP was found to have inappropriately claimed
£10,000 in expenses’. By comparing bad to good behaviour (rather than to a neutral
scenario), we provide the same amount of information in all scenarios and minimise the
impact of respondents’ prior beliefs about MP behaviour. The gender, party, age and
former job of both politicians also varied randomly. The incumbent could be Labour
or Conservative, and the challenger Labour, Conservative, or Liberal Democrat. The
possible ages were 45, 52 and 64 (incumbent) and 40, 52 and 64 (challenger). The
previous jobs were GP, journalist, political advisor, teacher or business manager.
Respondents were asked: ‘If you were living in this constituency at the next general
election, which party would you vote for?’ Depending on the parties of the politicians, the
answer options were: ‘The current Labour/Conservative MP’, ‘the Labour/Conservative/Liberal
Democrat challenger’, ‘the Labour/Conservative/Liberal Democrat candidate’, ‘a candid-
ate from another party’ or ‘no one, I would not vote’.
In an observational study, it would be difficult to determine whether differences in
how voters respond to misconduct by male and female MPs are due to hard-to-measure
characteristics (such as the severity of misconduct or the nature of local political pref-
erences) that may vary with MP gender. Different responses to comparable misconduct
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Figure 1: Screenshot of example choice task
by male and female MPs could also be caused by differences in how misconduct is repor-
ted: media coverage of misconduct depends on MP gender (Larcinese and Sircar 2017).
In our experiment, the conduct and gender of the MP are, by design, unrelated to the
political context and respondent characteristics, as is the information about MPs and
their conduct. Thus, although differences in voter responses to similar behaviour by male
and female MPs could in general be related to differences in the information voters re-
ceive about male and female MPs’ behaviour or to voters’ gender biases (or both), our
experiment focuses only on the latter channel.
Our survey experiment cannot replicate real-world vote choice, but we try to maintain
external validity in two ways. First, we present respondents with a multidimensional,
reasonably realistic choice setting. This should also reduce social desirability bias, as
respondents can justify their vote based on a number of considerations (Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Second, we primed respondents to think about partisan
considerations rather than MP gender or conduct in office by displaying party logos in
the choice tasks and including an introductory screen that characterized general elections
as opportunities to select a national government (see Appendix A).
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Results
Table 1 presents a series of linear probability models for incumbent vote. The raw
descriptive results (Appendix B) exhibit the same patterns. Models with controls for
respondent, incumbent and challenger characteristics (Appendix C); with interactions
between treatments and all measured respondent characteristics (Appendix D); for the
first choice task only (Appendix E); and taking into account challenger gender (Appendix
F) also all yield substantively identical results.
Model 1 shows that corrupt MPs are penalized: the probability of choosing the in-
cumbent MP is 24 percentage points lower for ‘bad’ than for ‘good’ MPs. Model 1 also
shows that female incumbents in general are not less likely to be supported and that
female voters are about as likely to vote for the incumbent as men.
Table 1: Probability of voting for incumbent, MP misconduct and gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.406∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
MP misconduct −0.240∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019)
MP female 0.014 0.023∗ 0.014 −0.001
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.020)
Respondent female −0.008 −0.008 0.019 −0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
MP misconduct × MP female −0.018 0.020
(0.018) (0.026)
MP misconduct × Resp. female −0.055∗∗∗ −0.019
(0.021) (0.027)
MP female × Resp. female 0.048∗
(0.028)
MP misconduct × MP female × Resp. female −0.072∗∗
(0.036)
Observations 9,810 9,810 9,810 9,810
R2 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.071
Note: OLS models. Dependent variable: Respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1)
or not (0). Standard errors clustered by respondent. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Model 2 shows little support for H1: female politicians are not punished significantly
more for wrongdoing than male politicians. The probability of voting for a male politi-
cian is 23 percentage points lower on average if the MP engaged in misconduct. This
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punishment is only 2 percentage points larger for female politicians, and the difference in
effects is not statistically significant.
Model 3 shows that, consistent with H2, female respondents punish MP misconduct
more harshly (by over 5 percentage points) than male respondents. While this echoes a
finding in Esarey and Chirillo (2013), the differential punishment by gender we detect
cannot be attributed to differences in the extent to which male and female voters are
aware of MP misconduct.
Figure 2: Effect of incumbent conduct by incumbent gender and respondent gender
l
l
l
l
l
l
Male voter
Female voter
Difference in effects
(Female MP − Male MP)
Female MP
Male MP
Difference in effects
(Female MP − Male MP)
Female MP
Male MP
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0
Effect of MP misconduct on support for incumbent
(a) Treatment effects
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Male voter
Female voter
Female MP
Male MP
Female MP
Male MP
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Predicted support for incumbent
MP conduct l lGood conduct Misconduct
(b) Predicted support
Note: Panel (a) compares the treatment effects of MP misconduct as MP and voter
gender varies. Panel (b) plots predicted probability of voting for the incumbent. 95%
confidence intervals shown. Based on Model 4, Table 1.
Next, Model 4 tests H3 by including a three-way interaction that permits punishment
by MP gender to vary by voter gender. This interaction term is significant: the con-
ditioning effect of politician gender on punishment for misconduct is different for male
and female voters. Figure 2a presents the estimated treatment effect of MP misconduct
across different combinations of voter gender and MP gender. Among female voters, the
negative effect of misconduct is about 5 percentage points greater for female incumbent
MPs. In contrast, among male voters, the effect of misconduct does not differ signific-
antly by MP gender, although the point estimate of punishment is slightly smaller (in
absolute terms) for female MPs.
Figure 2b presents predicted probabilities based on Model 4. These show two reasons
why the punishment is particularly large when the voter and the MP are female: the
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highest incumbent support is when a female respondent faces a non-corrupt female in-
cumbent, and the lowest incumbent support is when a female respondent faces a corrupt
female incumbent. So, female respondents particularly like a female incumbent who is
not corrupt and particularly dislike a female incumbent who is corrupt. The figure also
helps to explain why we find no difference in punishment of female and male MPs (H1):
female voters appear to punish female MPs more than male MPs, but male voters if
anything punish them less.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that voters on average punish misconduct similarly among male and
female politicians. If female politicians do face greater accountability, this is probably
not because voters treat female politicians more harshly. Yet, our findings leave open
the possibility that voters are more aware of misconduct by female politicians (e.g. Lar-
cinese and Sircar 2017) or perceive similar behaviour by men and women differently. Our
findings also suggest that female voters are more responsive to corruption among female
than among male politicians, in particular because women react more to good behaviour
by female politicians. This provides the first experimental evidence that men and women
differ in how they hold male and female politicians accountable for misconduct.
Would similar effects be found in a real UK election? While we used a represent-
ative sample and included strong incumbency and party cues and a weak gender cue,
our effects might be biased upwards if our participants reacted to key attributes more
strongly than they would in a real election. Would similar effects would be found in other
contexts? Electoral systems affect accountability patterns (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer
forthcoming). Gender effects might be greater under open-list than under closed-list pro-
portional representation systems, as in the former it is easier to cast a personal vote.
Future research in other institutional settings can usefully test this proposition.
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Appendices
A Introductory screen in online experiment
Figure A.1 shows the introductory screen that respondents received at the start of our
experiment. Note that the screen primes respondents to think about a general election
in terms of national government formation, political parties and party leaders. This
emphasis was intended to enhance the external validity of respondent choices in the
subsequent constituency contests. Partisan electoral considerations are often primed by
national media in the run-up to general elections and such considerations may often
overpower gender stereotypes (Dolan 2014a).
Figure A.1: Screenshot of introduction to experiment
i
B Raw incumbent voting rates
Table B.1: Voting rates by MP misconduct, MP gender and respondent gender
Incumbent
Resp. gender MP gender MP conduct Share N
Male Male Good 40.0 1246
Bad 17.8 1191
Female Good 39.9 1224
Bad 19.7 1139
Female Male Good 39.5 1210
Bad 15.5 1261
Female Good 44.2 1247
Bad 14.9 1292
Note: The table reports the percentage support for the incumbent MP among observa-
tions with each combination of MP conduct, MP gender and respondent gender, as well
as the total number of each type of observation.
ii
C Results with controls
The regression models reported in Table 1 of the main text do not include any con-
trol variables. In this Appendix, we show results when we control for respondent, MP
and challenger characteristics, because including these controls substantially improves the
precision of parameter estimates. The precise controls for the respondents are: gender,
age group (25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indic-
ators for whether the respondent identifies with the incumbents’ party, the challenger’s
party, or some other party (vs no reported party identification). The MP and challenger
characteristics we control for are gender, age and previous occupation. Finally, we also
control for the party match-up in vignette (Conservative vs Labour, Labour vs Conser-
vative, Conservative vs Liberal Democrat, Labour vs Liberal Democrat). We re-estimate
each of the models from Table 1 with these controls. Table C.1 shows the results for each
model specification with and without controls. Comparing each pair of Models (e.g.,
Models 7 and 8) , it is clear that adding or removing controls yields has little effect on
the coefficient point estimates, though as expected standard errors are reduced in the
models with controls.
iii
Table C.1: Probability of voting for incumbent MP by misconduct and gender, including models without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.406∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.024)
MP misconduct −0.240∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
MP female 0.014 0.011 0.023∗ 0.017∗ 0.014 0.011 −0.001 −0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.020) (0.014)
Respondent female −0.008 −0.004 −0.008 −0.004 0.019 0.022∗ −0.005 0.001
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)
MP misconduct × MP female −0.018 −0.014 0.020 0.027
(0.018) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019)
MP misconduct × Resp. female −0.055∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.013
(0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.022)
MP female × Resp. female 0.048∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.028) (0.020)
MP misconduct × MP female × Resp. female −0.072∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.028)
Controls for voter, MP and chall. characteristics? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 9,810 9,800 9,810 9,800 9,810 9,800 9,810 9,800
R2 0.071 0.436 0.071 0.436 0.072 0.436 0.072 0.437
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.434 0.070 0.434 0.071 0.435 0.071 0.435
Note: OLS models. Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not (0).
Controls are respondent gender, age group (25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indicators for whether
the respondent identifies with the incumbents’ party, the challenger’s party, or some other party (vs no reported party identification);
incumbent and challenger gender, age and previous occupation and party match-up in vignette (Conservative vs Labour, Labour vs
Conservative, Conservative vs Lib Dem, Labour vs Lib Dem). Standard errors clustered by respondent. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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D Robustness to more extensive controls
In the main paper we find that female voters on average punish incumbent miscon-
duct more than male voters, and that this difference is particularly pronounced when the
incumbent is female rather than male. While MP misconduct and MP gender are ran-
domly assigned treatments in our experiment, voter gender is of course not. Furthermore,
even the models from Table C.1 of the Appendix C control only for the main effects of
other voter characteristics. Therefore, one may wonder whether the observed differences
in treatment effects among male and female voters could be attributable to some other
respondent variable that co-varies with respondent gender in our sample.
To examine whether this might be the case, we re-estimated Models 6 and 8 from
Table C.1 of Appendix C, which included an interaction between treatment variables and
respondent gender, and added to these models equivalent interactions between treatment
effects and each respondent control variable included in the original model. Thus, for the
model which contains the MP misconduct × respondent gender interaction, we add an
MP misconduct × Z interaction for every respondent control variable Z. For the model
which contains the three-way interaction MP misconduct × MP gender × respondent
gender, we add an MP misconduct × MP gender × Z interaction for every respondent
control variable Z.
Table D.1 shows the results for each model specification with and without these ad-
ditional interaction terms (Models 1 and 3 are equivalent to Models 6 and 8 in Table C.1
of Appendix C). Comparing each pair of Models, it is clear that adding or removing the
interactions between treatments and respondent control variables has little effect on the
magnitude or significance of the interactions between respondent gender and experimental
treatments.
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Table D.1: Probability of voting for incumbent MP by misconduct and gender, controlling for voter attribute × treatment interac-
tions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP misconduct × Resp. female −0.053∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.078
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.063)
MP misconduct × MP female × Resp. female −0.078∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗
(0.028) (0.027)
Controls for main effects of voter, MP and chall. characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for voter characteristic × MP misconduct interactions? No Yes No Yes
Controls for voter characteristic × MP misconduct × MP gender interactions and constituent terms? No No No Yes
Observations 9,800 9,800 9,800 9,800
R2 0.436 0.464 0.437 0.466
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.462 0.435 0.463
Note: OLS models. Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not (0). Voter
characteristic controls are gender, age group (25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indicators for whether
the respondent identifies with the incumbents’ party, the challenger’s party, or some other party (vs no reported party identification).
Incumbent and challenger characteristic controls are incumbent and challenger gender, age and previous occupation and party match-up
in vignette (Conservative vs Labour, Labour vs Conservative, Conservative vs Lib Dem, Labour vs Lib Dem). Standard errors clustered
by respondent. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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E First choice task versus all choice tasks
The regression models reported in Table 1 of the main text are estimated based on
respondents’ choices in all five choice tasks. To check that our results are not an artefact
of respondent learning as they progress through choice tasks, we re-estimate each model
on data from respondents’ first choice task only. Tables E.1 and E.2 show the results
for each model specification in the first-task subsample and the full sample, without and
with controls, respectively. Comparing each pair of Models (e.g., Models 7 and 8), it
is clear that subsetting to data from the first choice task generally yields little change
in the direction and magnitude of coefficient point estimates, although standard errors
are substantially increased due to the substantial reduction in sample size. The one
exception is Model 8 in Table E.1, which shows different patterns than Model 7; note,
however, that in the Models with controls in Table E.2, the patterns for the first task
and all tasks remain very similar.
vii
Table E.1: Robustness of main regression results in first choice task subsample
All tasks First task All tasks First task All tasks First task All tasks First task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.406∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027)
MP misconduct −0.240∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) (0.028) (0.019) (0.039)
MP female 0.014 0.027 0.023∗ 0.013 0.014 0.028 −0.001 0.030
(0.009) (0.019) (0.014) (0.028) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.039)
Respondent female −0.008 −0.003 −0.008 −0.004 0.019 0.049∗ −0.005 0.065∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.039)
MP misconduct × MP female −0.018 0.026 0.020 0.003
(0.018) (0.039) (0.026) (0.055)
MP misconduct × Resp. female −0.055∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.125∗∗
(0.021) (0.039) (0.027) (0.055)
MP female × Resp. female 0.048∗ −0.033
(0.028) (0.056)
MP misconduct × MP female × Resp. female −0.072∗∗ 0.048
(0.036) (0.078)
Observations 9,810 1,962 9,810 1,962 9,810 1,962 9,810 1,962
R2 0.071 0.081 0.071 0.081 0.072 0.084 0.072 0.084
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.079 0.070 0.079 0.071 0.082 0.071 0.081
Note: OLS models run on observations from respondents’ first choice task only (odd-numbered models) or observations from all choice
tasks (even-numbered models). Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not
(0). For models run on data from all choice tasks, standard errors clustered by respondent. For models run on data from respondents’
first choice task only, standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table E.2: Robustness of main regression results in first choice task subsample, incorporating controls
All tasks First task All tasks First task All tasks First task All tasks First task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.262∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.044) (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.047)
MP misconduct −0.243∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015) (0.031)
MP female 0.011 0.035∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.032 0.011 0.035∗∗ −0.004 −0.003
(0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031)
Respondent female −0.004 0.003 −0.004 0.003 0.022∗ 0.041∗ 0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) (0.031)
MP misconduct × MP female −0.014 0.006 0.027 0.054
(0.014) (0.031) (0.019) (0.044)
MP misconduct × Resp. female −0.053∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.013 −0.026
(0.018) (0.031) (0.022) (0.044)
MP female × Resp. female 0.043∗∗ 0.072
(0.020) (0.045)
MP misconduct × MP female × Resp. female −0.078∗∗∗ −0.095
(0.028) (0.062)
Controls for voter, MP and chall. characteristics? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,800 1,960 9,800 1,960 9,800 1,960 9,800 1,960
R2 0.436 0.429 0.436 0.429 0.436 0.430 0.437 0.431
Adjusted R2 0.434 0.421 0.434 0.421 0.435 0.422 0.435 0.422
Note: OLS models run on observations from respondents’ first choice task only (odd-numbered models) or observations from all choice
tasks (even-numbered models). Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent votes for the incumbent MP (1) or
not (0). Controls are respondent gender, age group (25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indicators
for whether the respondent identifies with the incumbents’ party, the challenger’s party, or some other party (vs no reported party
identification); incumbent and challenger gender, age and previous occupation and party match-up in vignette (Conservative vs Labour,
Labour vs Conservative, Conservative vs Lib Dem, Labour vs Lib Dem). For models run on data from all choice tasks, standard errors
clustered by respondent. For models run on data from respondents’ first choice task only, standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust
(HC3). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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F Conditioning effects of challenger gender
Here we present evidence on how challenger gender interacts with voter and incumbent
gender in shaping reactions to misconduct. It could be that having two main candidates
who are women increases the attention that women pay to the political situation, or
that women respond to the female-only contests differently because they can hold the fe-
male incumbent accountable without sacrificing another potential goal, namely increasing
substantive representation through having a female MP.
To examine these possibilities we divide the sample into male and female respondents,
then for each sub-sample estimate a regression model of incumbent voting that includes
a three-way interaction between MP conduct, MP gender and the gender of the main
challenger. We thus allow for the interaction between MP misconduct, MP gender and
challenger gender to vary for male and female respondents. Table F.1 shows the estimated
models. The coefficient estimates are very similar whether we include controls (Models
3 and 4) or not (Models 1 and 2).
Based on the models with controls, Figure F.1 compares the marginal effects of MP
misconduct across varying combinations of MP, challenger and respondent gender. There
is some suggestive evidence in Figure F.1 that female voters (bottom panel) punish mis-
behaving female MPs more than misbehaving male MPs to a greater extent when the
main challenger is also female. According to the p-value on the three-way interaction
term in Model 4 of Table F.1 this difference is significant at the 0.1 level. In contrast,
for male voters (top panel) there is less of a difference in punishment for misconduct
regardless of MP or challenger gender.
In sum, we find some tentative evidence that, among female voters, the difference
in punishment of male and female politicians may be more pronounced when the main
challenger is also female.
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Table F.1: Probability of voting for incumbent, MP misconduct, MP gender and chal-
lenger gender
Male resp. Female resp. Male resp. Female resp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.402∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034)
MP misconduct −0.224∗∗∗ −0.251∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022)
MP female 0.012 0.033 −0.007 0.024
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.021)
Challenger female −0.004 −0.002 −0.012 −0.015
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020)
MP misconduct × MP female 0.023 −0.022 0.038 −0.017
(0.037) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029)
MP misconduct × Chall. female 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.037
(0.035) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026)
MP female × Chall. female −0.026 0.028 0.005 0.030
(0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.030)
MP misconduct × MP female × Chall. female −0.009 −0.063 −0.024 −0.068∗
(0.051) (0.048) (0.038) (0.039)
Controls for voter, MP and chall. characteristics? No No Yes Yes
Observations 4,800 5,010 4,795 5,005
R2 0.055 0.090 0.463 0.417
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.088 0.460 0.413
Note: OLS models. Dependent variable is a binary measure of whether a respondent
votes for the incumbent MP (1) or not (0). Controls are respondent gender, age group
(25-39, 40-59, 60 and above), social grade (AB or C1 vs C2 or DE) and indicators for
whether the respondent identifies with the incumbents’ party, the challenger’s party, or
some other party (vs no reported party identification); incumbent and challenger gender,
age and previous occupation and party match-up in vignette (Conservative vs Labour,
Labour vs Conservative, Conservative vs Lib Dem, Labour vs Lib Dem). Standard errors
clustered by respondent. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Figure F.1: Effect of misconduct by voter, incumbent and challenger gender
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Note: Effects calculated based on Models 3 and 4, Table F.1.
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